for one such x or all such that maximize f (x). This is the realm of optimization models such as Linear, Integer, Nonlinear, Dynamic Programming,and Control Theory and Calculus of Variations.
Individual Decision Making under Risk
Consider a "gamble" in which one of n outcomes whose "monetary" worths are a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n will occur (these are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive outcomes). Let the probability of occurrence of outcome a i be p i (p i ≥ 0; n i=1 p i = 1). Q: How much is it worth to participate in this "gamble"? Expected "monetary" value of this "gamble' is
But is this the worth? Consider the famous "St. Petersburg Paradox" due to D. Bernoulli: A "fair" coin (one that lands "heads" with probability 1 2 and tails with probability ) is tossed until a head appears and the process stops when this happens. The participant in this "gamble" receives an amount 2 n if the the first head appears on the n th toss (and the game stops here). The probability that the "gamble" stops at the n th toss is (
) n and hence the expected value is ∞. It follows that one should be willing to pay any price to participate in such a gamble. But most people are not willing to do this! Bernoulli argued that the "utility" (internal value) for n units of money is not a linear function but a concave function of n. [He used a specific form of lg n]. But there are many such functions and this theory may not apply to a one shot process. These functions may be dependant on the individual. The idea here is to show the existence of a linear function for each individual that satisfies certain axioms. This function is called the "utility" function for that individual and all decisions made by this individual (it is argued) are dependant on maximizing this function. That it is linear is very convenient. Now we develop this theory on an axiomatic basis. It is based an essential idea that is described below.
Suppose there three outcomes A, B, and C. Further suppose that the individual under consideration has the following preference among these outcomes: ApB, BpC and (hence by transitivity which we take to be true as indicated by "rationality" of the individual!) ApC. Now consider "gamble" G(q) whose outcomes are A with probability (1−q) and C with probability q. "Clearly" if q = 1, this "gamble" seems equivalent to C and if q = 0, it seems equivalent to A. As q changes from 0 to 1, "clearly" a rational individual would have the following preferences: ApGpC for all values of q ∈ (0, 1). But how does G(q) compare with B? Recall ApBpC. So there are two questions:
Q1: Is there a value of q ∈ [0, 1] such that G(q)iB? [Here the relation DiE means that neither the relation DpE nor the relation EpD holds and we think of the individual as being indifferent between these two outcomes.] Q2: Is the value of q in Q1 unique and is q ∈ (0, 1)? Under the axioms we postulate, the answers to both questions are in the affirmative. One has to be very careful is using these values that we get as numbers. They DO NOT have all the properties usually associated with numbers.
An Axiomatic Treatment of Utility Theory
This section can be found in Games and Decisions by Luce and Raiffa and G. Owen's Game Theory. Our discussion follows Owen's book.
Ordinal Utility
Utility Axioms:
1. Given any two outcomes A and B, exactly one of the following must hold: ApB, BpA, AiB; the last of these refers to indifference.
2.
AiA holds for all A 3. AiB ⇔ BiA 4. The relations p and i are transitive. These are explained in the following two statements:
5. These two are about a combination of the two relations:
The word "ordinal" refers to the idea that ApB does not tell us by how much A is preferred -this is not quantified; only the order relation holds. For some problems this presents no difficulty but when we consider risk we need some sort of quantification. For example if we want to compare a "gamble" or a "lottery" with probabilistic outcomes in comparison with a certain outcome or other probabilistic outcomes we need this.
Lotteries/Gambles
Let A and B be two outcomes and let 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Then by rA + (1 − r)B we mean a gamble/lottery in which the outcome A occurs with probability r and the outcome B occurs with probability (1 − r). Lotteries with more outcomes are defined in a similar manner.
Combinations of lotteries obeys the usual laws of arithmetic (and linear algebra). Hence the following are assumed to hold: Case II This is dealt with in the following theorem. (ii) AiE 1 : Let u(A) = 1.
Theorem 2 There exists a function u mapping outcomes into real numbers, such that
(iii) E 1 pApE 0 :So by continuity axiom and above theorem, there is a unique value for r ∈ (0, 1) such that
(iv) AiE 0 : Let u(A) = 0.
(v) E 1 pE 0 pA : So by continuity axiom and above theorem, there is a unique value for r ∈ (0, 1) such that [rE 1 + (1 − r)A]iE 0 . Let u(A) be so chosen as to satisfy:
Please note that all these choices are unique after the first two. To check that this u satisfies all the required conditions is tedious but simple. Now suppose that there is another such function v. Let
Now it is again tedium to verify that v = αu + β holds. This completes the proof.
Commodity Bundles
A natural application of utility theory is on commodity bundles. One has to be very clear to make the distinction between bundles and lotteries. An outcome could be a commodity bundle which is represented by a vector (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) of n commodity quantities. So we need to define a utility function for such bundles. A lottery (rq ′ +(1−r)q" is a bundle q ′ with probability r and a bundle q" with probability (1 − r). The bundle q defined as a linear combination of bundles q ′ and q" with weights r and (1 − r) must be distinguished from the above lottery. It is best illustrated with the following example. Suppose the bundles consist of cars and tires. Let It is expected that
-monotonicity assumption. If we assume that u(q) is continuous, has continuous first and second partial derivatives, partial derivatives ∂u ∂q j := u j are called shadow prices (these represent the marginal utility of this commodity at the given level). j th commodity is said to be subject to the law of diminishing returns if, for all q, u jj :=
th commodity is said to be grossly substitutable for j th commodity if
So if we decrease the amount of j th commodity this increases the shadow price of i th commodity. Normally u ij = u ji , it follows that this is a symmetric relation. If u ij = u ji ≥ 0 these commodities are said to be complementary. If u(q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) = w(q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n−1 ) + ϕ(q n )
we say that this function (or this commodity) is separable. A separable commodity can be used as a medium for exchange. In some cases the function ϕ is linear; and if this holds for two individuals, then we say that this commodity is linearly transferable between to players of a game. A transfer of this n th commodity (called side payment) is used to correct any inequity that the process of dividing the first n − 1 commodities may have caused. We will use this in cooperative forms of games.
Absolute Utility Some times we want to determine "will this action help individual A more than it hurt individual B?" Since units of utility for each individual are arbitrary, they can not be used to answer this question. Such comparisons are done some times, if the functions for two individuals are bounded, by scaling the intervals to the same length. But there are difficulties with this process as well. J. Isbell uses this to argue for bounded utilities but his argument has flaws.
Individual Preferences in a group to a consensus group preference This area is commonly referred to by citing K. Arrow's famous Impossibility Theorem.
